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Some Developments in Conflict of Laws
Elliott E. Cheatham*
The economy and the social systems of our country are national in
character. From Maine to California, and now on to Hawaii and
Alaska, goods and people move freely. The legal systems, in con-
trast, make a checkerboard, with each of the fifty states having its
own laws and courts. In the international area, there is a distant
parallel. South and west of the iron curtain there is increasing move-
ment of goods and people across national frontiers, but the nations
continue to cherish their legal differences. It is the responsibility of
conflict of laws to deal with the interaction of the two sets of systems:
one the economic and social systems and ready movement across legal
frontiers, the other the diverse legal systems each one firmly anchored
in the territory of its state or nation. The descriptive name of the
subject and its task would be Coordination (not Conflict) of Laws.
In its work of coordination, conflict of laws has changed greatly in
the past generation under the impact of several factors. One of these
factors is the extraordinary development in ease and speed of trans-
portation which has increased the mobility of our people and
strengthened the national character of our society. A second is the
alteration in the international area, with in one aspect the same de-
velopments in transportation increasing commercial relations among
the nations, yet in another aspect with the rise of totalitarian nations
splitting asunder what had promised to be a harmonious international
scene. A third is the rejection of hampering theories of analytical
jurisprudence and a consequent freedom in the wise development of
the law.
The last and least obvious of the three sets of factors is a part of a
change in our whole attitude toward law. The decades following
World War I saw great stirrings in the law, with reaction against an
old view well described in a notable article by Dean Erwin Griswold:
The nineteenth century was the century of analytical jurisprudence .... It
was under the influence of Austin's purely logical approach that Dean
Langdell developed the case method of instruction eighty-five years ago.
To him "the law" was to be found in books .... And the method of study
was analytical, virtually mechanical, with each step being deduced by a
purely logical process from the materials in the authoritative cases.1
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Charles Evans Hughes Professor Emeritus
of Law, Columbia University; former president, Association of American Law Schools;
co-editor, Cheatham, Goodrich, Griswold & Reese, Cases an Conflict of Laws.
1. Griswold, Law Schools and Human Relations, 1955 WASH. U.L.Q. 217, 219.
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In no area of law was the reaction more vigorous than in conflict of
laws, which had been narrowly confined by assumptions on the scope
of operation of a state's laws. Freeing itself from these conceptions,
conflict of laws is now able to give effect to the dominant social
policies in the coordination of laws.
This article, sketching some recent developments, follows the tra-
ditional division into jurisdiction of courts, foreign judgments, and
choice of law. It ends with mention of the role of federal law and
of federal courts law in the coordination of laws, and with a bare
reminder of some aspects of international conflict of laws.
JURISDICTION OF COURTS
When a plaintiff wished to bring an action on his claim, the old
common-law view was that he must seek out the defendant and file
the action where the defendant could be found and served with
process. The law has moved far from that starting point. The most
important development is the expansion of jurisdiction based on ac-
tivities of the defendant within the state of the forum. Its beginnings
go back to an action in Ohio on a life insurance policy issued there
by an agent of the defendant, an Indiana corporation. In a later
action in Indiana on the Ohio judgment against the defendant the
objection was raised that the Indiana corporation, a creation of
Indiana law, "could have no existence out of that State and, con-
sequently, could not be sued in Ohio," The court overrode the ob-
jection by the fiction of consent, stating that the Indiana corporation
by doing business in Ohio had consented to the conditions of suit
imposed by an Ohio statute.2 Over the years, the courts "accepted
and then abandoned 'consent,' 'doing business,' and 'presence' as the
standard for measuring the extent of state judicial power over such
corporations." 3
Then came one of those leading cases which pull together tentative
or fragmentary doctrine into a coherent whole and lay down a broad
principle as a firm basis for future development, International Shoe
Co. v. Washington.4 International Shoe Company, a Delaware cor-
poration with a principal place of business in Missouri, followed a
plan under which the company would sell its products to retailers
in the state of Washington and yet would be insulated, so it hoped,
from the tax laws and the courts of the state. The plan called for
about a dozen salesmen of the company to call on merchants in
Washington and solicit orders, but for the orders to be sent to Mis-
2. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856).
3. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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souri for acceptance or rejection there and for the goods to be
shipped f.o.b. Missouri. Despite the formal insulation, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the foreign corporation was
subject to tax by the State of Washington and to the jurisdiction of
its courts. Chief Justice Stone laid down as the general test for judicial
jurisdiction "such contacts of the corporation with the state of the
forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of
government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit
which is brought there."5 In a later case, which held the making of a
single contract of insurance with a resident of a state a sufficient basis
for jurisdiction in an action on the contract, there was a more explicit
statement of the economic and social changes which justify the ex-
pansion of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other non-
residents, as, "the fundamental transformation of our national economy
over the years," "increasing nationalization of commerce," and "mod-
ern transportation and communication" which make it "less burden-
some for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages
in economic activity.
6
The broadening of jurisdiction under the United States Constitution
has shifted the principal questions for lawyers from constitutional
law to state law; does the law of the state of the forum authorize
its courts to take jurisdiction under these circumstances? Here, too,
there has been notable expansion. The supreme court of at least
one state has reinterpreted its statute of competence over foreign
corporations to make it reach as far as the Constitution permits.7 In
most states, the readjustment has been by statute. A good example
is a statute of Wisconsin which sets out in great detail the kinds of
activity in the state on which the authority of its courts may rest.,
Other states, such as Illinois and New York, have employed short
and sweeping statutes.9
The use of activity as a basis of judicial jurisdiction over an in-
dividual defendant began, as with the corporate defendant, through
the fiction of consent to be sued, in a non-resident motorist case.10
On economic activity generally as a basis of jurisdiction over the
individual defendant, the Supreme Court of the United States has
not yet spoken. Many of the states assume there is jurisdiction under
the Constitution in such a situation and by their statutes authorize
the exercise of jurisdiction over non-resident individuals as to causes
5. Id. at 317.
6. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra note 3, at 222-23.
7. Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437 (1958).
8. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1963).
9. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 302.
10. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
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of action arising out of the doing of business or even out of single
acts within the state. The question remains whether the reasons of
policy mentioned above justify the same broad jurisdiction over the
little individual defendant as over the large foreign corporation, and
what the lines of distinction between the two kinds of defendants
shall be."
JUDGMENTS
Judgments of sister states are protected by the full faith and credit
clause of the United States Constitution and the implementing
statute, so that in this matter interstate conflict of laws is principally
federal law. The high political purpose of the full faith and credit
clause is that of "a nationally unifying force .. .making each [state]
an integral part of a single nation." 2 Once there is jurisdiction and a
judgment is secured, the Constitution precludes any inquiry into the
facts or the law.13 A lawyer had better use all his ammunition in the
first state and not nurse the hope his case and he will live to fight in
a second state.
The most striking recent development concerns divorce, in the
aspects of both jurisdiction to grant a divorce and protection of a
divorce decree once granted. In response to the mobile habits of our
people and to a changing social attitude toward divorce, the law
on foreign divorce is being made over, beginning in 1942 with the
first Williams case.14 The legal principles employed to this end are
that the domicile of one spouse alone is sufficient basis for jurisdiction
in a divorce proceeding, and that conclusiveness can be given to an
allegation and finding of domicile in the state of the divorce forum
provided the other spouse was a party to the case. A troubling aspect
is the economic rights of an abandoned wife, that is, her right to
continued support by the husband who has obtained at his new
domicile a divorce and, probably, a new wife. The difficulty has been
dealt with by the doctrine of divisible divorce. Such a divorce may
be good in ending the personal relationship but not in terminating
the economic duty; the husband who has remarried after the divorce
has one wife as to bed, but two wives as to board.'5 The economic
right of the first wife to support is protected, provided her lawyer
is careful to keep her from being subjected to the jurisdiction of the
divorce forum. Does her economic right against her former husband
extend beyond support during his life, to a share as widow in his
11. See Allied Fin. Co. v. Prosser, 103 Ga. App. 538, 119 S.E.2d 813 (1961).
12. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943).
13. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
14. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
15. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
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estate on his death? The question has not yet been answered.'
The judgments of courts of foreign nations are not within the con-
stitutional protection of full faith and credit. Nonetheless they are
ordinarily respected and enforced, if in the foreign forum there were
the essentials of jurisdiction and a fair hearing.16 To give this pro-
tection a firmer basis in these days of expanding international com-
merce, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have recently
drafted a proposed uniform state law on the subject.'7 An old de-
cision by a closely divided Supreme Court of the United States held
that reciprocity in protection of American judgments was an essential
to protection of the judgment of a foreign nation.18 The state courts,
however, have imposed no such requirement.' 9
There is one important caution throughout the preceding discussion
of jurisdiction and judgments-there must be notice to the opposing
party. While the bases of jurisdiction have been liberalized, there has
been increasing insistence on fair notice as an essential to an effective
judicial proceeding and to the validity of a judgment.20
CHOICE OF LAW
Common lawyers are traditionally averse to general theories and
even pride themselves on their supposed freedom from them. Lord
Birkenhead was introduced at a dinner as "a great jurist." "I have
never been so insulted in my life," the Lord Chancellor is reported
to have said when he rose to speak. "I am not a jurist at all. I am an
English lawyer and judge." Yet general ideas, even theories of juris-
prudence, rule us and all the more so when we take them unexamined
and for granted. Certainly, it has been so in conflict of laws. The
recent development of the subject began with the struggle against
an old hampering theory and then a search for a freer and wiser basis
of choice of law.
The theory of vested rights long dominated the language of the
American courts and the writings on conflict of laws. The conception
of law on which the theory rested was that the law of the place of
the last element of an occurrence necessarily governs the rights of
the parties to the occurrence. From this conception there were de-
duced such rules of choice of law as that the law of the place of ac-
ceptance of an offer necessarily determines whether there was a
16. Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUm.
L. REv. 783 (1950).
17. UN=ORM FoRiGN MONEY-JUDGm=NT RECOGNiTON ACT.
18. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
19. Reese, supra note 14.
20. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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contract. The theory has been devastatingly attacked. As a perceptive
judge concluded:
the vested rights doctrine has long since been discredited because it fails to
take account of underlying policy considerations in evaluating the significance
to be ascribed to the circumstance that an act had a foreign situs in de-
determining the rights and liabilities which arise out of that act
21
The consequent heavier burden cast on judges has been stated by
another who has been in the lead in both the overthrow and the re-
building: "The demolition of obsolete theories makes the judge's task
harder, as he works his way out of the wreckage; but it leaves him
free to weigh competing policies without preconceptions that purport
to compel the decision, but in fact do not."22 The competing policies,
which these two judges emphasize as guides, are numerous and varied,
and their points of reconciliation are difficult to state. The tentative
drafts of Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, employ the general
test of "most significant relationship" for choice of law in both torts
and contracts, with more specific statements as to some matters
where definiteness is possible.23
The most dramatic development in choice of law has been by
statute, in section 1-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Code
permits the parties to a transaction to choose the law when the
transaction bears a reasonable relation to the chosen state, and
failing such a choice the Code applies to "transactions bearing an
appropriate relation to this state." The influence of the Code goes
beyond its immediate range of application. It is a legislative rejection
of the vested rights theory and a statement of a broad, affirmative
principle. The courts, the legislatures, and the commentators to-
gether are remaking choice of law rules so as to advance the policies
believed dominant.
FFmiAt~I. LAW
In the Preamble the Constitution of the United States proclaims
as its first purpose "to form a more perfect Union," and in Article VI
it makes federal law "the supreme Law of the Land." Three kinds of
effects of the Law of the Land on different areas of conflict of laws
call for mention.
One effect is to supplant all state laws on a subject and by sub-
stituting a single federal law for the old state variety to obliterate
21. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 478, 191 N.E.2d, 279, 281 (1963) (Fuld, J.).
22. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230,
234.




interstate conflict of laws as to that subject. An- obvious example is
the Federal Employer's Liability Act.24 When there is a wreck in
interstate commerce, the rights of the railroad trainmen against the
railroad company are determined by federal law, even though the
rights of injured passengers are left to the conflict of laws among the
states.
A second effect is to leave the state local laws untouched, but to
supplant the state rules of conflict of laws with a federal law. This is
the effect of the full faith and credit clause and the implementing
statute in the protection of sister state judgments.
A third effect of federal law is to restrain state conflict of laws
within the range of reasonableness, but not to supplant it. This is
what federal law now does as to jurisdiction of state courts and the
requirement of notice. As to choice of law, the effect has varied. At
one time, the Supreme Court of the United States seemed ready to
write the vested rights theory into the Constitution and thus to
prescribe the exact choice of law the state courts should make.
Quickly, however, the Court retreated from that position and now, in
"appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction," it leaves
wide latitude of choice to the states.25 More recently, it has begun
guardedly to require the enforcement of sister state causes of action
under the full faith and credit clause.26
FEDERAL CouRTs LAW
The role of federal courts in conflict of laws was long obscured by
the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson2 7 that there was a special federal
courts common law in matters of commercial or general law. The
overruling of that case by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins2 8 wiped out the
separate law of the federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases.
The Erie principle applies to conflict of laws, so the federal courts
follow the conflict of laws rules of the states in which they sit.29 The
wise policy underlying this result was well stated in a circuit court of
appeals case: "it is unfair and unseemly to have the outcome of
litigation substantially affected by the fortuitous existence of diversity
of citizenship."30 If, however, the cause of action is one under federal
law and the question involves the range of application of the law of
24. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).
25. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
26. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
27. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
28. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
29. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
30. Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
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the United States in the international area, then the answer is given
by federal law.3'
INTEmNATioNAL CoNFLicr oF LAws
In this country, the principles of conflict of laws developed pri-
marily in interstate matters, so there was lacking the aura of suspicion
and hostility that may exist in international matters.32 When inter-
national cases came up, the principles developed in the intranational
cases were transferred almost unquestioningly to the international
matters. This is fortunate in these days of expanding international
relations. Three cautions, however, are in order. First, the great in-
crease of commercial activities by foreign nations and national agen-
cies requires modification of the old principle that a foreign nation
is immune from judicial jurisdiction.P Second, the hostility and aggres-
siveness of totalitarian regimes calls for more careful scrutiny of their
laws and decrees. Lastly and in quite a different tone, the social
arrangements in foreign societies must be viewed and treated with
understanding and without provincialism, if fairness is to be done.
Fairness was done in a California case, which held two contemporane-
ous wives under a valid foreign polygamous marriage were entitled
to share equally in the estate in this country of their deceased hus-
band, even though he could not have kept the two of them in his
household here. 4 The distinction reached as to the contemporaneous
wives is similar to the difference between economic claims and per-
sonal relations of successive wives under the doctrine of divisible
divorce in this country.
There remains the question whether international conflict of laws
is governed by state law or by federal law. It has been widely assumed
that except for treaties and federal statutes it is governed by state law,
thus varying from state to state.3 Yet inevitably international private
law bears on foreign relations. In a case involving a bank deposit in
New York and a later executive agreement, the Supreme Court of the
United States used sweeping language on the range of federal law:
Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested
exclusively in the national government .... In respect of all international
negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally,
31. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
32. Du Bois, The Significance in Conflict of Laws of the Distinction Between Inter-
state and International Transactions, 17 MmnN. L. REv. 361 (1932).
33. See RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAv oF THE UITED STATES § 72 (1962).
34. In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 83 Cal. App. 2d 256, 188 P.2d 499 (1948).
35. See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); UNIFoRm FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENT
REcOGNMON AcT.
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state lines disappear. As to such purposes the State of New York does not
exist.3
In a case at this term of the Court two justices in a dissenting opinion
revived the question of control by federal law, saying that "even in
absence of a treaty, a State's policy may disturb foreign relations."av
The question cannot yet be answered.
36. United States v, Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330, 331 (1937).
37. Ioannou v. New York, 371 U.S. 30, 32 (1962).

